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NANCY J.

KING

Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez
A B ST R ACT. This Essay argues that the Court's effort to expand habeas review of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in Martinez v. Ryan will make little difference in either the
enforcement of the right to the effective assistance of counsel or the provision of competent
representation in state criminal cases. Drawing upon statistics about habeas litigation and
emerging case law, the Essay first explains why Martinez is not likely to lead to more federal
habeas grants of relief. It then presents new empirical information about state postconviction
review (cases filed, counsel, hearings, and relief rates), post-Martinez decisions, and anecdotal
reports from the states to explain why, even if federal habeas grants increase, state courts and
legislatures are unlikely to respond by invigorating state collateral review. The Essay concludes
that alternative means, other than case-by-case postconviction review, will be needed to ensure
the provision of effective assistance.
A U T H O R. Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
My thanks to Selah Lodge for her assistance with research for this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION

Last Term the Supreme Court unexpectedly expanded postconviction
review of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in three decisions:
Martinez v. Ryan,' Lafler v. Cooper,2 and Missouri v. Frye.3 In Martinez, the Court
announced a new equitable rule for federal habeas corpus cases, allowing
merits review of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that
was not addressed during a petitioner's attack on his conviction or sentence in
state court, if the petitioner lacked the effective assistance of counsel to raise it
there. 4 In Lafler and Frye, the Court enlarged the definition of ineffective
assistance itself, declaring that bad advice during plea negotiations can amount
to ineffective assistance if it deprives the defendant of a favorable plea deal,5
allowing more petitioners than ever before to raise a ineffectiveness challenge
to their convictions in state postconviction and federal habeas proceedings.
All three cases have attracted attention, but this Essay addresses the
consequences of Martinez in particular. Commentators have documented how
feeble postconviction review has turned out to be in ensuring competent
representation.' Some hope that the Martinez ruling will increase federal
oversight of effective assistance in the states and enhance procedural
protections in state postconviction review.7 Justices Scalia and Thomas
predicted in dissent that the decision would leave states no choice but to

1.

132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).

2.

132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).

3.

132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).

4.

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.

5.

Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410-11; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390-91.

6.

E.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE. L.J. 2604, 2608-11 (2013).

7.

See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction
ProceedingsAfter Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFsTRA L. REv. (forthcoming 2013); Primus,
supra note 6, at 2607 (characterizing Martinez as "the first step down a path toward
reinvigorating Gideon"); Gray R. Proctor, Habeas Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 After
Martinez v. Ryan: Federalization and Forum Shopping for Ineffective-Assistance Claims, 92
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Dec. 5, 2012) (concluding that Martinez "clearly helps" federal
habeas petitioners and "very likely ... will prove to be more important than" other recent
right-to-counsel cases); Mary Schmid Mergler, Supreme CourtSets CriticalNew Precedents on
Right to Counsel, ACSBLOG (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/supreme-court
-sets-critical-new-precedents-on-right-to-counsel.
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appoint counsel for all indigent petitioners in postconviction proceedings.!
Others have warned that states may eliminate state postconviction review
rather than take that step. 9 In this Essay I question these predictions and argue
that the Court's effort to expand habeas review of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in Martinez will make little difference in either the enforcement
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel or the provision of competent
representation in state criminal cases.
Drawing upon statistics about habeas litigation and emerging case law,
Part I explains why Martinez is not likely to lead to more federal habeas grants
of relief. Using new empirical information about state postconviction review,
as well as post-Martinez decisions and anecdotal reports from the states, Part II
further explains why, even if federal habeas grants increase, state courts and
legislatures are unlikely to respond by invigorating state collateral review. The
Conclusion argues that the limitations of postconviction review as a regulatory
approach suggest the need to consider alternatives.
I.

MARTINEZ AND FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

The rule in Martinez is not likely to raise the notoriously low rate of relief in
federal habeas. Before Martinez was decided, less than 1% of noncapital habeas
petitions were granted for any claim." This is unlikely to change after Martinez

J.,

8.

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1327 (Scalia,

9.

Brief for the States of Wisconsin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 36 n.22,
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001), 2011 WL 4072899 at *36 (urging the Court not to
"articulate a rule that would encourage a State to curtail an avenue of review that it might
otherwise make available to its citizens in order to thwart meddling by the federal courts
that undermine the finality of state court decisions").

io.

See Nancy J. King, Non-CapitalHabeas CasesAfter Appellate Review: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 24
FED. SENT'G REP. 308, 310 (2012) (reporting final outcomes of more than 2,3oo randomly
selected federal habeas cases from among those filed nationwide by state prisoners in 2003
and 2004). Even though an estimated half of the study cases raised some sort of
ineffectiveness claim, see NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL

dissenting).

TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTs: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND

EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/grants
/21 9 5 59 .pdf, in only two of those cases did a court eventually grant relief for the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, see King, supra, at 315.
A survey of even more recent cases from Michigan confirms just how rarely ineffective
assistance of trial counsel (IATC) claims raised by state prisoners succeed. The Attorney
General's Office reported that of the 3,605 federal habeas petitions that it defended in the
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for two reasons: few additional petitioners will receive merits review, and those
that do remain unlikely to win.
Martinez expands only slightly a narrow exception to the "state procedural
default" doctrine, which generally requires a federal court to dismiss, without
addressing the merits, any constitutional claim that a state court has refused to
address because of the petitioner's failure to comply with state rules." Martinez
allows a federal court to reach the merits of such "defaulted" claims, but only if
the claim alleges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC), is
"substantial," and was raised improperly or not at all in the petitioner's initial
collateral review proceeding in state court." But the exception is narrow
indeed. As lower court decisions applying Martinez demonstrate, if a

six-year period from 2005 to 2010, only loo were granted by federal district courts for any
claim. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, Div. Chief, Appellate Div., Mich. Dep't of Att'y
Gen., to Ronald J. Schafer, Ionia Cnty. Prosecuting Att'y 3-4 (Jan. 23, 2012) (on file with
author). Only 45 of those grants were for an IATC claim, at least 17 of which were reversed
by the federal courts of appeals. Id. Federal judges, in other words, granted relief to
approximately 1.3% of habeas petitioners raising IATC claims.
I rely on two assumptions in calculating this figure: First, I assume that during the
same period Michigan prisoners filed about 1,800 additional petitions that federal courts
dismissed or denied without asking the state to respond, resulting in approximately 5,400
total petitions. This assumption is based in part on data initially gathered for KING ET AL.,
supra, showing that approximately one-third of habeas petitions filed by Michigan prisoners
were dismissed without a filing by the state, but it is also supported by federal caseload
statistics. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov
/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx (showing, in Table C-3, 5,655 total habeas
suits filed in Michigan district courts from March 2005 to March 2011). Second, I assume
approximately 2,100 (39%) of those 5,400 petitions included an IATC claim. This assumption
is also based in part on data initially gathered for KING ET AL., supra, showing that
approximately 39% of Michigan habeas petitions raised an ineffectiveness claim, but it is also
close to the percentage of state postconviction challenges that include this claim. See
Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, Dir., Mich. State Appellate Defender Office 5 (Dec. 2,
2011) (on file with author) (noting IATC claims are raised in about 35-370% of the state
postconviction cases litigated by the state appellate defender office, which represents onequarter of the state's indigent defendants seeking appellate review). The 28 petitions granted
by federal courts thus represent 1.3% of the estimated 2,100 petitions that included IATC
claims.

n.

For more on the defense of procedural default and the details of the Martinez case, see 6
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§

28.4 ( 3 d ed. 2007 &

Supp.

2012); and

Primus, supra note 6, at 2608-18.
1z.

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. Lower courts have also refused to apply Martinez in cases from
states that permit petitioners to raise IATC claims based on the record on direct appeal,
Primus, supra note 6, at 2618-20, but the Court may address this particular issue this Term.
See Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App'x 415 (5th Cit. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012).
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petitioner's claim was filed in federal court beyond the statute of limitations"
or in a successive petition," was defaulted on direct or collateral appeal rather
than at the initial collateral proceeding," or was raised by a petitioner who
never sought state postconviction relief'6 or declined representation when he
did," the Martinez gateway to merits review remains closed.
More importantly, securing merits review in federal habeas is no magic
bullet. Before Martinez, federal district courts were considering the merits of
constitutional claims in approximately half of all noncapital habeas cases, and
denying more than 99% of them. 8 And Martinez has not changed the reasons
why federal judges deny almost all of the IATC claims they review on the
merits.

Assume, arguendo, that petitioners lose at least some IATC claims on the
merits because they lack counsel (only 7% have attorneys)' 9 and do not receive
evidentiary hearings (less than 1% receive hearings).2 There is no sign in post-

13.

See, e.g., Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 322 n.6 ( 5 th Cir. 2012); Sudduth v. Clements, No.
12-CV-oo6 4 5 , 2012 WL 5289592 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2012); Hines v. Hobbs, No. 5 :12CV00321,
2012 WL 5416920 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 24, 2012); Capers v. Walsh, No. CIV.A. 12-4780, 2012 WL
5389513 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2012).

14.

See, e.g., Osborne v. Purkett, No. 03-6 5 3-CV-W, 2012 WL 5511676 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14,
2012); Gale v. Wetzel, No. 1:12-CV-131 5 , 2012 WL 5467540 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012); see also
KING ET AL., supra note 1o, at 46-48 (reporting that 29% of noncapital cases were dismissed
as either time-barred or successive, and that only 13% were dismissed at least in part as
defaulted).

is.

See, e.g., Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F. 3 d 1082, 1087 (8th Cit. 2012).

16.

See, e.g., Jones v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 492 F. App'x 242 (3d Cir. 2012); Uptegrove v.
Villmer, No. 12-0456-CV-W, 2012 WL 3637707 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2012); Bland v. Hobbs,
No. 5:11-CV-oo286, 2012 WL 2389904 (E.D. Ark. June 12, 2012).

17.

18.

See, e.g., Bender v. Wynder, No. 05-998, 2012 WL 6737840 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2012);
Thompson v. Varano, No. 12-1479, 2012 WL 3740622 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2012).
KING ET AL., supra note 1o, at 45, 56. The study found that federal courts did not reach the
merits in between 42% and 58% of terminated noncapital cases. See NANCY J. KING &JOSEPH
L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE GREAT WRIT 205 n.44 (2011).

19.

King, supra note 1o, at 315-16 (finding also that, of those petitioners from the 2007 study
who succeeded in the district courts, 67%, or eight of twelve, had attorneys); see also Justin
F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas ProcessRather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
85, 132 (2012) (arguing that the rate of relief in noncapital cases would be much higher if
petitioners had a right to counsel).

20.

KING ET AL., supra note lo, at 36. These
SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED

two features are linked. See RULES GOVERNING
STATES DISTRICT COURTS R. 8(c) (2010),
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Martinez decisions that Martinez has deterred judges from rejecting IATC
claims without first providing counsel or hearings. Martinez did not lessen the
fiscal pressures on the judicial branch, which pays for appointed counsel in
habeas cases, nor did it create any right to counsel. And even though it is
within a judge's discretion to permit a petitioner to develop new facts for
claims dismissed rather than denied in state court," federal judges after
Martinez continue to deny IATC claims on their merits and without hearings
when the petitioner was not diligent in developing the record in state court,22
when his allegations are refuted by the record," or when those allegations

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/22 54 -22 55 .pdf ("If an evidentiary hearing
warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent [an indigent petitioner].").

is

21.

See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

22.

See, e.g., Gallow v. Cooper, No. 10-30861, 2012 WL 3641520 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2012)
(applying § 2254(e)); Halvorsen v. Parker, No. 08-484, 2012 WL 5866620 (E.D. Ky. Nov.
19, 2012); Williams v. Mitchell, No. 1:09 CV 2246, 2012 WL 4505181 at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept.
28, 2012) (rejecting a request to allow claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel to establish "cause" for a "default" of the factual development of claims for relief in
state court, finding "nothing in Martinez that suggests the Supreme Court intended its
limited holding to apply so broadly and in such a different context"). But see Proctor, supra
note 7, at 279 (arguing that the "reasoning of Martinez would seem to require that the
Supreme Court redefine 'failure' to exclude cases where counsel is responsible for the
undeveloped state of the record," and that petitioners "bringing Martinez-excused claims are
very likely to meet this lower standard for an evidentiary hearing").

23.

See, e.g., Walker v. Kerestes, No. 10-2009, 2012 WL 5494683, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012)
(reviewing a pro se petitioner's defaulted IATC claim on its merits and concluding that the
petitioner failed "to come forward with some factual matter beyond his own bald
assertions"); Woodson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 6:1o-cv-649, 2012 WL 5199614 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 22, 2012) (rejecting, based on the record, a defaulted IATC claim raised by a pro se
petitioner and finding that the claim is not substantial because the petitioner cannot show
prejudice); Boseman v. Warden of Lee Corr. Inst., No. 2:11-3265, 2012 WL 5380636 (D.S.C.
Sept. 24, 2012) (rejecting a new IATC claim on the merits without counsel or a hearing
when one allegation was refuted by the record and another lacked prejudice); Glenn v.
Wynder, No. Civ.A. 06-513, 2012 WL 4107827 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) (finding that a
represented petitioner's defaulted IATC claim was not substantial and denying a hearing);
Haley v. Sauers, No. 10-5o61, 2012 WL 3163951, at *12 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2012) (rejecting
multiple new IATC claims without a hearing or counsel, and noting that an unsupported
assertion "does not represent a substantial claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness");
Etenburn v. Norman, No. 4:11 CV 1181, 2012 WL 3027923 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2012) (finding
a claim not substantial, as it was refuted by the record); Madison v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of

1398 (2011); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474
(2007); see also Banks v. Workman, 692 F. 3 d 1133, 1144 n.4 (ioth Cir. 2012) ("[A]n
evidentiary hearing is not a fishing expedition. Instead, its function is to resolve disputed
facts. And for that reason, a habeas court .. . 'is required to conduct the evidentiary hearing
only if the admissible evidence presented by petitioner, if accepted as true, would warrant
relief as a matter of law."' (quoting United States v. Velarde, 485 F-3d 553, 560 (ioth Cir.
2007))).
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would be futile if believed.' Indeed, this was the outcome of Martinez's own
claim on remand."
Some have also predicted that by allowing judges to apply de novo review
rather than "reasonableness" review for these otherwise defaulted claims,
Martinez might increase the rate of relief2 6 But judges applying de novo review
after Martinez are continuing to find allegations of ineffective assistance
unsupported, implausible, and insubstantial,2 7 just as they do when denying

2012 WL 2680041 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2012) (denying a hearing and
counsel and finding that an IATC claim was meritless even under de novo review).

Corr., No. 3 :09-CV-444,

The record before a federal judge may include trial counsel's affidavit, submitted either
by the state or the petitioner. See, e.g., Horonzy v. Smith, No. 1:11-CV-oo235, 2012 WL
4017927 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2012) (ordering an unrepresented petitioner to submit portions
of his trial attorney's file, letters the attorney had written to him about the status of the case,
and/or an affidavit from her regarding the extent and nature of her work on his case);
Rogers v. Pearson, No. 1:11cv1281, 2012 WL 3691085 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2012) (denying
discovery and hearing and rejecting an IATC claim on the merits when conflicts between
affidavits and testimony were insufficient to establish prejudice).
24.

E.g., Suber v. Kerestes, No. 09-1049, 2012 WL 6681696 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2012) (denying a
pro se petitioner's defaulted IATC claim as meritless, without a hearing); Johnson v. Denny,
No. 12-o960-CV-W-BP-P, 2012 WL 5904321, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 26, 2012) (denying a
pro se petitioner's IATC claim in part because "there was no reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different"); Cooper v. Warden of Lebanon Corr. Inst.,
No. 3:12cv00059, 2012 WL 5511320 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2012) (recommending that a pro se
petitioner's IATC claim be denied without a hearing); McCormack v. Baldridge, No. 1:10CV-00289, 2012 WL 4138479 (D. Idaho Sept. 19, 2012) (denying discovery, a hearing, and
counsel, and denying an IATC claim, finding no prejudice possible); Anderson v. Hobbs,
No. 5:10CV00258, 2012 WL 3111680 (E.D. Ark. July 9, 2012) (recommending the denial and
dismissal of a pro se petition and finding that claims defaulted in state court where the
prisoner had no counsel and no hearing were not substantial); Sinyard v. Mitchim, No 3:11CV-01398, 2012 WL 3502374 (N.D. Ala. June 13, 2012) (denying a pro se petitioner's IATC
claim without a hearing and noting that there was no evidence of prejudice, after the state
court also denied hearing and counsel).

25.

Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV

26.

See Proctor, supra note 7, at 279 (also noting that district courts addressing the merits of
otherwise defaulted IATC claims after Martinez will be able to apply circuit precedent, not
just Supreme Court precedent); see also Michael M. O'Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to
Effective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney
Incompetence, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 110, 118 (2012) (arguing that granting Strickland claims
when the reasonableness standard does not apply carries less "sting" for state courts and
does not weaken the reasonableness standard for other cases).

27.

See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clements, No. 12-cv-01884, 2012 WL 6217388, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec 13,

08-785,

2012 WL 5936566, at *6-13 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2012).

2012) (finding, without a hearing, that a pro se petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel were not substantial); Woodson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 6:10-cv-649, 2012 WL
5199614 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2012) (finding an IATC claim insubstantial); Rogers v. Pearson,
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IATC claims raised by pro se federal prisoners in § 2255 cases using de novo
review.28 Strickland, as many have noted, is a very high bar, and Martinez did
not lower it one notch.
Two other developments suggest that for those petitioners who make it
through the Martinez gateway to merits review, winning LATC claims may
become more difficult, not easier, in the years to come. The first is the creeping
acceptance of negotiated waivers of the right to seek postconviction review of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Judges are finding that such waivers
bar later claims that an attorney provided constitutionally deficient
representation both leading up to a guilty plea and after an agreement has been
reached, and it is reasonable to assume prosecutors will embrace such a useful
cost-saver whenever they can.2 9
Second, the Frye and Lafler decisions, announced shortly after Martinez and
widely hailed as victories for indigent defendants, may, ironically, make it more
difficult for prisoners to win IATC claims. Some judges have enthusiastically
accepted the Court's invitation in Frye to "establish[]" at the plea colloquy
"that the defendant has been given proper advice,"3" finding new ways to
secure on-the-record statements from defense counsel that all plea offers were
explained to the defendant and that the defendant was satisfied with his
counsel's advice.? In courtrooms where judges are wary of either intruding into

1:11NCV1281, 2012 WL 3691085 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2012) (denying requests for discovery and
an evidentiary hearing, and addressing an IATC claim and rejecting it on the merits while
noting that "conflicts between the affidavits and Detective Harris' testimony are insufficient
to establish that Rogers' defense was prejudiced"); Parker v. Curley, No. Civ.A. 10-5569,
2012 WL 4931029 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2012) (finding IATC claims meritless based on the
record, as an alternative ground, after the state court had rejected them as meritless without
a hearing). This is no surprise. Federal judges before Martinez applied de novo rather than
reasonableness review to a significant portion of claims and denied relief anyway. See KING
ET AL., supra note io, at 50.
28.

See, e.g., United States v. Gorham-Bey, Nos. CR 7-442, CV 12-366, 2012 WL 3155652 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 2, 2012) (rejecting pro se allegations of IATC without a hearing and finding no
prejudice); United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, No. 07-CR-oo26, 2012 WL 2277784, at *2
(D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (denying counsel and finding allegations of coercion and prejudice
refuted by the defendant's record admission that she pleaded guilty "voluntarily and of
[her] own free will" because she "committed a crime").

29.

See Nancy

30.

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406-07 (2012).

31.

Norman L. Reimer, Frye and Lafler: Much Ado About What We Do-And What Prosecutors
and Judges Should Not Do, CHAMPION, Apr. 2012, at 7, 7-8; D. Brock Homby, Script of
Proceeding, Rule ii-Guilty Plea (May 15, 2012), http://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf
/dbhscript.ruleii.pdf (asking the defendant, as part of a federal district judge's script for a

2436
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privileged communications or participating in plea negotiations," prosecutors
may obtain such proof on their own. After Lafler and Frye, some prosecutors in
Tennessee report that they will not make any offer at all unless defense counsel
agrees to sign a new form that states the offer terms and that the offer was
conveyed to the defendant.33 Before agreeing to any trial date, the defendant
himself must sign that he "knowingly rejects the State's previous offer(s) and
elects to set his/her case for trial," and defense counsel must sign that the
defendant "has been advised of the State's offer(s) and the benefits and
disadvantages of proceeding to trial."4 Other prosecutors ask each defendant
to sign a statement of satisfaction with his representation, or insist that all
offers and responses be in writing with copies to the defendant. Armed with
such proof, prosecutors can more easily repel any later IATC attack on its
merits."

plea colloquy, whether he has "consulted with your lawyer in detail on this subject" and
whether he is "satisfied with" his lawyer's advice); see also Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea
Bargainingand ExtrajudicialReforms, 126 HARv. L. REv. 150, 165, 167-68 (2012) (discussing
ways in which prosecutors and judges can "make clean records to bulletproof their
convictions").
32.

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, United States v. Davila, No. 12-167
(U.S. Aug. 13, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/9/12-167Petition.pdf (noting the difficulty of complying with the suggestion in Frye without
inadvertently "participating" in negotiations). The Court will review this Term whether a
violation of Rule 11's ban on judicial participation requires reversal without regard to
prejudice. United States v. Davila, 664 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 831
(2013).

33.

Office of the Dist. Att'y Gen., Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Plea Negotiation
Memorandum [hereinafter Plea Negotiation Memorandum] (on file with author). As one
prosecutor explained: "If a defendant refuses to sign, then he doesn't get the offer. Defense
attorneys love it because it protects them from ineffectiveness claims. And judges are happy
to do anything that helps in [postconviction review]." E-mail from Pamela Anderson,
Assistant Dist. Att'y Gen., Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty., to author (Nov. 28, 2012,
7:31 PM) (on file with author).

34. Plea Negotiation Memorandum, supra note 33.
3s.

See, e.g., Capers v. Walsh, No. 12-4780, 2012 WL 5389513 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by
No. 12-4780, 2012 WL 5395797 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2012) (noting that one reason the state
court rejected the petitioner's IATC allegation for failing to call alibi witnesses was that the
defendant had "waived his ineffectiveness claims by stating during an on-the-record
colloquy that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation and he did not want to call
any witnesses at trial"); Ellis v. Wengler, No. 1:10-CV-00405, 2012 WL 4009565 (D. Idaho
Sept. 12, 2012) (finding an IATC claim insubstantial when the "plea questionnaire"
completed by the petitioner before his sentencing hearing refuted his allegation that he was
misled by his attorney and his own admissions precluded a finding of prejudice); Breeden v.
State, No. 2011-CP-00437, 2012 WL 3665049 (Miss. App. Aug. 28, 2012) (finding that
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Even if federal courts do begin to grant more IATC claims after Martinez,
there is little reason to expect state courts to provide more attorneys, hearings,
or relief for these claims in their postconviction proceedings. Nor are states
likely to withhold postconviction review and turn over enforcement to federal
courts. Section II.A provides a preliminary empirical baseline for measuring
potential changes in state postconviction litigation, and Section II.B explains
why no such changes are likely to occur.
A. State PostconvictionReview Before Martinez
State postconviction review is beginning to attract the attention of legal
scholars.3 6 Yet there has been no attempt to find out how many noncapital
prisoners seek postconviction relief in state courts each year, much less how
many of these cases actually involve counsel, a state response, fact-finding, or
relief.37 Without data, one can only guess what really goes on during this phase
of the criminal process, and what effect a decision like Martinez might have on
that process. The dearth of information is understandable: in some states, a
request for postconviction relief is docketed like any other motion in a criminal
case, and so even counting how many requests are filed would require an
inspection of each docket sheet. Nevertheless, I was able to obtain some

allegations of IATC were contradicted by sworn testimony that the petitioner had been
thoroughly advised and was satisfied with his attorneys' services).
36. E.g., Eric M. Freedman, State Post-ConvictionRemedies in the Next Fifteen Years: How Synergy
Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the CriminalJustice System Nationally,
24 FED. SENT'G REP. 298, 298 (2012) ("[T]he adequacy of state postconviction proceedings
will be a centrally contested issue in the years ahead."); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 85, 146-56, 166-76 (2011);
O'Hear, supra note 26, at 11o, 120 (emphasizing the need for state postconviction courts to
take the lead in developing and enforcing effective assistance standards); Eve Brensike
Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 12 (2010) (advocating a
"focus on systemic state practices"); Samuel R. Wiseman, HabeasAfter Pinholster, 53 B.C. L.
REv. 953, 972-86 (2012) (discussing potential challenges to fact-finding procedures in state
proceedings).

37.

Neither the National Center for State Courts nor the Bureau of Justice Statistics attempts to
collect information on state postconviction proceedings. The latest effort to do so was two
decades ago, examining cases in four states. See Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REv. 237 (1995)
(reporting a study of cases filed between 1990 and 1992 in Alabama, California, New York,
and Texas).
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aggregate information about these proceedings from fifteen of the thirty states
with the largest prison populations (1o,ooo or more in 2010). The summary
below provides the first empirical snapshot of contemporary state
postconviction review, one that, albeit incomplete, might serve as a baseline for
measuring potential change.
1. FilingRates
Table 1 reports, for fifteen states, the number of requests for relief filed
using each state's primary postconviction remedy during the years 2008 to
2011. Tables 2A and 2B compare these filings with convictions, for those states
with conviction data available. The number of defendants who seek
postconviction relief is surprisingly small - roughly 3% of the total number of
convictions from the state's trial court of general jurisdiction, or 3-4% of felony
convictions. If these states are representative, postconviction review is
irrelevant for more than 96% of cases in our nation's criminal courts. 8

See also Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note io, at 3 (reporting that in
Michigan, where postconviction claims are raised on direct appeal, 7% of those convicted of
felonies and eligible to appeal seek review, and about 23% of those withdraw their appeals,
for an appeal rate of just over 5%).
Even less is known about how many of the petitioners who do seek review raise IATC
claims, but it is likely near 40%. Twenty years ago, approximately 40% of state
postconviction petitioners in the four states examined by Flango and McKenna were raising
some sort of ineffectiveness claim, including appellate as well as trial counsel. Flango
McKenna, supra note 37, at 249-50. Michigan prisoners have raised trial-counsel
ineffectiveness claims at approximately the same rate in recent years. See Memorandum
from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note io, at 5. About half of those filing federal petitions ten
years ago raised either a trial or appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim. Id.
&

38.
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Table i.

-TA:
-0
- AR

181

154

182

177

AZ

2,257

1,875

1,746

2,192

CA

8,233

8,550

8,707

8,767

FL

17,750

17,866

15,757

17,506

n/a

n/a

n/a

1175

992

1,049

1,207

1,362

MO

963

1,066

1,033

998

MS

420

381

444

499

NJ

na

801

907

1,005

OR

501

596

580

494

PA40

693

1,621

1,980

1,944

SC

732

828

770

n/a

TN

535

496

427

531

TX

5,035

4,791

4,275

4,229

WA

1,084

1,053

978

873

GA

IN

39.

-

INITIAL COLLATERAL REVIEW FILINGS, NONCAPITAL CASES, BY STATE AND YEAR

39

Data from Indiana and South Carolina included death penalty cases.

40. These figures include amended petitions, so the totals overstate the actual number of cases
filed. See infra text accompanying note 72.
41.

Data from Texas and Washington included filings in the court of appeals.
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Table 2A.
RATIO OF POST-CONVICTION FILINGS TO TOTAL CONVICTIONS FROM GENERAL
JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS, BY STATE, 2010-2011

AR

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

AZ

0.050

CA

0.046

co4

0.045

0.045

0.036

0.036

0.051

0.053

0.051

0.053

0.008

0.007

0.007

n/a

n/a

Fl.

0.114

0.102

0.092

0.092

0.083

MO

o.oo8

0.008

n/a

0.008

n/a

NJ

0.026

0.025

0.025

0.023

0.023

PA

0.014

0.014

n/a

n/a

n/a

sc

n/a

n/a

n/a

0.015

o.o16

TN

0.006

0.006

0.006

0.005

0.005

Tx

0.036

0.035

0.036

0.036

0.036

WA

0.031

0.028

0.025

0.031

0.028

MEDIAN

oo26

0.025

o.o26

0.028

0.030

MEAN

0.031

0:030

0.033

0.030

0.032

3

42.

0.004

This method is designed to examine differing time lags between conviction and
postconviction filing. Total convictions include both felonies and misdemeanors.

43. These figures compare total postconviction review filings in 4 of 22 judicial districts between
November 1, 2o11, and April 30, 2012 (n = 79), to half the number of annual convictions
from those districts.

2441

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

122:2428

2013

Table 2B.
RATIO OF POST-CONVICTION FILINGS TO FELONY CONVICTIONS, BY STATE, 2010-2011

10.009

o.0o6

o.oo

o.oo6

0.051

0.045

0.046

0.036

0.037

0.053

0.062

0.064

0.062

o.064

AR

0.006

AZ

CA
45

0.020

o.o18

o.o18

n/a

rVa

MO

0.025

0.024

n/a

0.025

n/a

TX

0.039

0.036

0.036

0.036

0.037

WA

0.036

0.033

0.029

0.038

0.032

MEDIAN

0.036

o0.33

0.033

0.036

0.037

MEAN

0.033

0.032

0.033

0.034

0.035

co

2. Counsel and Hearings
Even fewer states collect information about counsel or hearings in state
postconviction proceedings. Based on available information, the provision of
counsel and hearings varies from almost always to nearly never. In all but the
handful of states with public defender offices specifically tasked with
postconviction representation,46 organized defender offices are often conflicted
out of postconviction cases because of IATC claims against them. That means
that when attorneys are appointed in these cases, they are more likely to be

44. This method is designed to examine differing time lags between conviction and
postconviction filing.

4s. These figures compare total postconviction review filings in 4 of 22 judicial districts between
November 1, 2011, and April 30, 2012 (n = 79), to half the number of annual felony
convictions from those districts.
46.

See Holly R. Stevens et al., Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, State,
County and Local Expendituresfor Indigent Defense Services: Fiscal Year 2oo8, A.B.A. (Nov.
2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legalaidindigent
(surveying funding for
.defendants/ls_sclaid_defexpenditures_fyo8.authcheckdam.pdf
indigent defense state by state).
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private attorneys rather than public defenders, 47 and private attorneys tend to
have fewer resources and face more difficult incentives than their public
defender counterparts.4 8 In some states, judges reportedly consider
postconviction cases good training for novice attorneys. 49
A minority of states do routinely appoint counsel in postconviction cases.
In Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, IATC and other postconviction
claims are included with the defendant's direct appeal (where all defendants
receive representation), with remand ordered by the appellate court when
necessary for record development." Judges in Missouri and Maryland, both
states with postconviction defender offices, reportedly appoint counsel
regularly for postconviction cases." The Court in Martinez listed a number of
additional states that it asserted "appoint counsel in every first collateral
proceeding."" In four of those states, however, some portion of pro se petitions
are actually dismissed without appointment because they are either beyond the
filing deadline or successive." And appointed counsel in other states, such as

47.

E.g., Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 1o, at 2 (noting that 83% of indigent
appeals are handled by private assigned counsel paid by counties).

48.

See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Diference Does the Lawyer Make? The
Effect ofDefense Counsel on MurderCase Outcomes, 122 YALE L. J. 154, 188-200 (2012).

49. Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, Assistant Dist. Att'y, Metro. Nashville & Davidson
Cnty., (Oct. 24, 2012); see also Donald J. Harris, Kim Nieves & Thomas M. Place, Dispatch
and Delay: Post Conviction ReliefAct Litigation in Non-Capital Cases, 41 DuQ. L. REV. 467, 482
(2003) (noting "the inexperience of many of the attorneys appointed to PCRA cases" in
Pennsylvania); Harris District Courts Plan, HARIUS CouNTY DIsTIucr CTs. (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlan/ViewPlan.aspx?PlanID=294 (imposing the least stringent
experience requirements on lawyers appointed to postconviction cases).

so.

See Brief for the States of Wisconsin et al., supra note 9, at 25.

Si.

Telephone Interview with Greg Mermelstein, Division Dir., Mo. State Pub. Defender (Nov.
20, 2012) (reporting that in Missouri, timely filed postconviction cases are not dismissed
before appointment and that all indigent petitioners are provided attorneys); Telephone
Interview with Scott Whitney, Chief Att'y, Collateral Rev. Div., Off. of the Pub. Defender
for Md. (Nov. 19, 2012) (noting that most postconviction cases in Maryland receive counsel,
but that a case may be dismissed without hearing or counsel if the petition is complete
gibberish, is filed without complying with the rules, is filed more than ten years after
sentencing unless "extraordinary cause" is established, or seeks to reopen earlier
postconviction proceedings).

52.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2012) (listing Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Maine,
North Carolina, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee).

53.

See ALASKA STAT.

§ 18.85.loo(c)(1) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-14-205 (2011); ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 32.4(c)(2) (2011); N.J. CT. R. 3 :22-6(b) (2011); see also Telephone Interview with
Roger Moore, supra note 49 ("We only get the [post-conviction] case if the judge finds a
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Pennsylvania,4 may be able to withdraw after filing an Anders brief."
Most states authorize the appointment of counsel for noncapital petitioners
only if a judge first decides the case has merit or orders a hearing or discovery.
In such states, only a small portion of petitioners appear to receive counsel. For
example, court records for postconviction cases filed in Mississippi between
2008 and 2011 show that in only 15% did any counsel appear for the
petitioner.5 6 In Texas, over the same period, the proportion is even smallerabout 10-12% of noncapital habeas petitioners receive counsel.? In Colorado, in
a forthcoming study of cases filed between November 2011 and April 2012 in
four judicial districts that produce approximately 30% of the state's felony
convictions, roughly a quarter of those seeking postconviction relief were
ultimately represented by counsel.58 In Georgia, no law authorizes payment for

colorable claim and assigns a lawyer. Most of them do here unless it is clear that the statute's
run. Anything that's within the statute and remotely sounds like [ineffective assistance of
counsel], we get.").
54.

E.g., Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 177, 1184 (Pa. 2012); see also Harris et al., supra note
49, at 474 (noting right to appointment of counsel for initial petitions and withdrawal
procedure).
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (permitting attorneys to withdraw if they
determine that no nonfrivolous issues exist on appeal).

56.

Case statistics provided by the Mississippi Administrative Office of the Courts (on file with
author).

57.

Noncapital state habeas petitions in Texas are filed in the trial courts, typically without
counsel, and then forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for resolution. See TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West 2007); TEX. R. APP. P. 7 3 .3 (2012); 43B GEORGE E. Dix
&

55.

JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAs PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

58:14 ( 3 d

ed. 2011 & Supp. 2012) ("[O]nly the Court of Criminal Appeals may grant relief in those
cases within the statute.. . . While the district courts have a role in the process, it is not that
of decision maker."); Telephone Interview with Kelley Reyes, Chief Deputy Clerk, Tex.
Court of Criminal Appeals (Oct. 3 & 17, 2012). That court orders appointment of counsel for
petitioners whose state habeas petitions are "filed and set" for further consideration in the
Court of Criminal Appeals, and also for those petitioners whose cases it remands for
factfinding in the trial courts. After remand, the case returns to the Court of Criminal
Appeals for resolution. Interview with Kelley Reyes, supra. Cases "filed and set" and cases
remanded for factfinding together represent approximately 11-12% of the noncapital habeas
petitions filed each year. See Office of Court Admin., Annual Reports, TEx. CTs.,
http://www.txcourts.gov/pubs/annual-reports.asp (last updated Nov. 30, 2012) (documenting
annual Court of Criminal Appeals activity) [hereinafter Texas Annual Reports].

58.

E-mail from Veronica Marceny, Policy Analyst, Div. of Planning & Analysis, Co. Office of
the State Court Adm'r, to author (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:27 PM) (on file with author) (describing
the study and its results).
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indigent defense representation in postconviction cases. 59
In at least some states where postconviction petitioners usually do receive
counsel - such as Alaska, Maryland, and Missouri - live witness hearings are
reportedly routine." Conversely, in states where counsel is not the norm,
neither are live witness hearings. In Washington state, where prisoners must
file their "personal restraint petitions" initially in the Court of Appeals, only
about 4.5% of those who filed in 2008 through 2011 received remands to the
trial court for any reason, including factual development. 6 ' In Texas, where
petitions are forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for resolution, about
7-8% of those filed each year are remanded by the Court of Criminal Appeals
for factual development in the trial court, but very few receive "live" hearings.
In 2011, of 347 remands, only two were for a hearing with live witnesses."
"Paper hearings" are also the norm in Oregon, where petitions are filed in the
trial courts. 63 In California, approximately 10% of the noncapital habeas cases
terminated in the trial courts receive hearings, but there is little consistency
among counties. In one California county, hearings are held in every single
case, while in others, courts dispose of hundreds of cases each year with no

59.

See Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ga. 1999); see also Wilson v. State, 686 S.E.2d
104, 108-09 (Ga. 2009) (Hunstein, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Gibson, 513 S.E.2d 186).

60. See Jones v. State, 284 P-3 d 853, 86o (Alaska Ct. App. 2012); Telephone Interview with Scott
Whitney, supra note 51 (stating that most cases in Maryland receive hearings, which involve
live testimony, not "paper hearings"); E-mail from Greg Mermelstein, Div. Dir., Mo. State
Pub. Defender, to author (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:07 PM) (on file with author) ("In general, you
have to have a hearing to win an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim here in Missouri,
so the attorneys testify 'live' at hearings (when you get a hearing).").

61.

Case statistics provided by the Washington State Administrative Office of the Courts (on
file with author).

62.

Court of Criminal Appeals Activity: FY 2011, TEX. CTS. 2 (Jan. 2012), http://www
.txcourts.gov/pubs/AR2ou/cca/2-cca-activity.pdf. Prior years' activity reports do not report
the number of live hearings granted.

63.

See PDSC Service Delivery Planfor Post Conviction Relief Cases, PUB. DEF. SERV. COMMISSION
22 (June 18, 2009), http://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/Reports/postconvictionrelief6og.pdf
(summarizing testimony of Judge James Hargreaves of the Oregon Circuit Court) ("Only
occasionally is live testimony presented at the hearing except for brief testimony by the
petitioner. It is a paper trial and that is the only way these cases can get done.") [hereinafter
PDSC Plan]; id. at 19 (summarizing the testimony of postconviction attorney Noel
Grefenson) ("Although there is a hearing in every case, most of the time [Mr. Grefenson]
does not call live witnesses.").
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hearings at all.61
3. Relief
What scarce information is available on wins and losses in these cases
suggests that relief, too, varies by state, but that in most states, petitioners
rarely succeed in challenging their convictions, even when represented by
counsel. Statistics were available from six states: Michigan, Texas,
Washington, South Carolina, Colorado, and Pennsylvania.
In Michigan, where IATC claims are raised with counsel on direct appeal
and remanded for a hearing if factfinding is required, the Wayne County
Prosecutor's Office, which handles about a quarter of the state's criminal
caseload, reported that in only 5 out of the over 1,200 court of appeals decisions
it received from 2008 to 2011 did a court order relief for an IATC claim. 6, If
Wayne County defendants raised IATC claims at the same rate (approximately
36%) as defendants from other Michigan counties,66 the grant rate for IATC
claims brought by represented prisoners in state court was less than 1%. (The
Michigan Attorney General, defending cases on behalf of county prosecutors in
the 56 smallest counties in the state, reported that in none of the 582 cases it

64. 2012 Court Statistics Report: Statewide Caseload Trends, JUD. CoUNCIL OF CAL. 153 tbl.12f
(2012), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2o12-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf. In a study
of petitions for postconviction relief filed in Pennsylvania trial courts between 1998 and
2001, hearing rates varied by county and judge as well. See Harris et al., supra note 49, at
487-89 (reporting that at least 88 of 230 cases (38%) were dismissed without a hearing in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, but also noting that some judges reported granting a
hearing for every timely petition); see also Wiseman, supra note 36, at 974-76 (surveying
rules for postconviction "fact development" in state courts).
65. Letter from Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training, and Appeals, Wayne Cnty.
Office of the Prosecuting Att'y, to Ronald Schafer, Prosecuting Att'y, Ionia Cnty.
Prosecutor's Office 1 (Feb. 14, 2012) (on file with author). Four of the five cases involved
retained, not appointed, counsel, id. at 2, and one was later reversed for reconsideration
under Lafler, People v. McCauley, 821 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012). It is possible that this
actually overstates the grant rate. Approximately 7,000 criminal appeals (appeals of right
and discretionary appeals from guilty-plea convictions) were filed statewide, in the years
2008 through 2011. E-mail from Larry Royster, Chief Clerk/Research Dir., Mich. Court of
Appeals, to author (Dec. 12, 2012, 3:13 PM) (on file with author). If Wayne County
prisoners filed 25% of these appeals, that would represent over 1,700, not 1,200, total appeals
during that period.
66. Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 1o, at 5 (reporting data from
2010).
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litigated between 2005 and 2010 did the state courts grant an IATC claim.6")
In Texas, where only the Court of Criminal Appeals (not the trial court) is
authorized to resolve these cases, approximately 4% of the noncapital state
habeas petitions filed result in a grant of any form of relief.68
In Washington, where petitioners initially file in the Court of Appeals,
which may either resolve the case or remand for resolution in the trial court,
the Court of Appeals has granted relief in about 1% of petitions filed between
2008 and 2011. Another 4.5% were remanded to the trial courts for unknown
resolution.'
In South Carolina, of 1,727 capital and noncapital postconviction cases
resolved by the trial courts in 2010 and 2011, at most 2.4% were granted relief

of any kind.70
Of the 79 postconviction motions filed in Colorado's four-district study of
cases filed in early 2012, only 2 received relief (in the form of resentencing), 11
are still pending, and the rest were denied or dismissed, resulting in a grant
rate of 2-16% depending upon the pending cases.71
Pennsylvania court statistics indicated a somewhat higher rate of relief.

67.

Letter from Joel D. McGormley, supra note 1o, at 2.

68.

See Texas Annual Reports, supra note 57.

69. Of the 3,801 total cases terminated between 20o8 and 2011 (including capital cases), the
court granted relief in 1.2%. See case statistics provided by the Washington State
Administrative Office of the Courts (on file with author).
70. A list of postconviction case numbers with disposition codes was provided to me by the
South Carolina Office of Court Administration in response to a statistics request. For each
case showing a disposition code of anything other than "dismissed" or "withdrawn," I
obtained additional docket information from the state court's webpage. See Case Records
Search, S.C. JUD. DEP'T, http://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). Only
42 of these 1,727 cases included an entry indicating that the final order was something other
than denial or dismissal. Of those 42, in 17 the docket entry indicated that the court had
ordered that the petitioner be allowed to file a belated appeal of a previous order rejecting
postconviction relief (no information was available on the outcome of any subsequent
appeal), and in 9 cases there were conflicting docket entries suggesting that relief was not
granted after all (that is, the docket showed either that the judgment was appealed by the
state or that the case status was "dismissal," or both). If these 26 cases are omitted, the grant
rate for these two years is less than 1%. Capital cases were included in the South Carolina
statistics, as they could not be distinguished from noncapital cases based on docket
information, but the state has sentenced four or fewer defendants to death each year since
2005. Death Sentences in the United States From 1977 By State and By Year, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CENTER,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008

(last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
i.

E-mail from Veronica Marceny, supra note 58.
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Court of Common Pleas judges granted these petitions, at least in part, in
approximately 18% of the 1,377 cases in which a petition for postconviction
relief was filed in 2011 and terminated by February 2013. Of those cases in
which a postconviction petition was granted, approximately 44% resulted only
in the reinstatement of the right to file a direct appeal or postsentence motion.
Another 22% of the grants involved some sort of sentencing relief, including
recalculation of sentencing credits. Only lo% of the grants (less than 2% of the
cases) clearly involved the withdrawal of a guilty plea, or a new trial.72
Attorneys in several other states also estimated that relief from conviction
was granted in a small percentage of cases, although the rate for other types of
claims (a chance at belated appeal, for example) varied.73

72.

Case statistics provided by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (on file with
author). The type of relief granted could not be determined in 24% of cases.

73.

PDSC Plan, supra note 63, at 21 (reporting an Oregon judge's testimony that "only three to
five percent have merit"); Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, Supervisor,
Appeals/Postconviction, Office of the Ohio Pub. Defender (Nov. 13, 2012) (on file with
author) (stating that so few cases succeed, "it is like a dead remedy"); Telephone Interview
with Greg Mermelstein, supra note 51 (reporting that in Missouri, approximately 2-10% of
cases filed result in some relief, many including sentencing reductions); E-mail from Scott
Whitney, Chief Att'y, Collateral Rev. Div., Office of the Pub. Defender for Md., to author
(Nov. 27, 2012, 4:55 PM) (on file with author) ("We [public defenders] win relief in about
25% of our cases. Often it is minor [claims] and the major allegations are denied. (For
example, the petitioner is granted the opportunity to file a belated appeal but his claims that
would require reversal of his conviction are denied.) . . . Most of the post conviction relief
granted in Maryland is the opportunity to file a belated motion for modification or
reduction of sentence.. . . [Out of] 600 petitions filed in a 12 month period . . . we do win
about 15-20 new trials each year.").

&

A comparison of the number of postconviction appeals in 2009-2011 with the number
of trial court filings from the preceding year, in four states-Arizona, California, Florida,
and Tennessee-suggests that on average appeal rates differ by state (ranging from 25% to
66%), with a median overall rate of 45%. Only a tiny percentage of those who lose in state
court petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Giovanna Shay
Christopher Lasch, Initiatinga New ConstitutionalDialogue: The Increased Importance Under
AEDPA ofSeeking Certiorarifrom Judgments of State Courts, 5o WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 249,
255-58 (2008) (reporting that only 4% of criminal certiorari petitions during the Supreme
Court's 2006 Term sought review of state postconviction decisions, and offering
explanations from survey responses indicating why so few are filed).
For relief statistics from prior studies, see Flango & McKenna, supra note 37, at 259
(reporting an 8% relief rate for ineffective assistance claims); John S. Gillig, Kentucky PostConviction Remedies and theJudicialDevelopment of Kentucky Rule of CriminalProcedure11.42,
83 KY. L.J. 265, 343 (1994) (reporting that a new trial was ordered in only 2% of 342
published opinions in appeals of adverse decisions); and Stephen J. Perrello & Albert N.
Delzeit, Habeas Corpus in San Diego Superior Court (1991-1993): An Empirical Study, 19 T.
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B. State Postconviction Review After Martinez: The Forecastfor Change

This snapshot of state postconviction review reveals that before Martinez,
many prisoners had only the slimmest hope of securing counsel or a hearing,
much less relief, for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. There is no
reason to expect that Martinez will change this. Even expanded federal review
of ineffectiveness claims is unlikely to prompt an increase in the number of
filings, hearings, appointed counsel, or grants in state postconviction cases.

1. Filing Rates
Better prospects of securing relief in federal court won't encourage many
more state prisoners to file IATC claims in state court, for at least three
reasons. First, all but a few states now postpone consideration of IATC
challenges until after direct appeal, 74 and many have recently taken steps to
reduce terms of incarceration.75 Both policies reduce postconviction filings
because prisoners who would file if still incarcerated will be released before
they have the chance.' 6
Second, even those who are still incarcerated when it is time to file may be
deterred by the possibility that filing could delay their release on parole.
Prisoners with indeterminate sentences may worry that challenging their
criminal judgments will jeopardize their chances for discretionary release if the
attack is seen as evidence of failure to take full responsibility for their crimes. 77

JEFFERSON

L. REv.

283,

at

294 (1997)

(reporting a

2%

relief rate). In addition, a study of

approximately 4,000 petitions filed between 1998 and 2001 in three large counties in
Pennsylvania found that less than 2% resulted in a grant of either a new trial or a sentencing
hearing. An additional 9% of petitioners had their appellate rights restored. Harris et al.,
supra note 49, at 490.
74.

See State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 2010) (overruling an earlier requirement that a
defendant demonstrate the potential viability of any ineffective assistance claim raised on
direct appeal in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief); LAFAvE ET AL., supra
note 11, §§ 11.7(e), 28.4; Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 689 (2007).

75.

Steps have included reducing minimum terms of incarceration, accelerating parole
eligibility, and expanding good time credits. See generally LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 26.1(c) n.39.4 (collecting authority).

76.

See, e.g., KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 18, at 73-76.

77.

Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73 (stating that the parole board takes a
collateral attack on the conviction as evidence that a prisoner has not taken full
responsibility for his crime, but noting that only a portion of Ohio prisoners get
discretionary release); Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 ("If a prisoner
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Third, a prisoner who has negotiated a plea bargain is not going to file once
he learns that seeking postconviction relief may cost him his deal,' and the
Court's decisions in Martinez, Frye, and Lafler did nothing to dispel this
apprehension. Rather, in state courts where plea negotiations had previously
been conducted informally, the Court's suggestion in Frye that every deal be
recorded in writing79 will strengthen this disinclination to file because it will
make even more clear to a defendant each and every charge and sentencing
concession he stands to lose by upending his plea bargain.'o Formalizing
bargaining and creating records demonstrating that defendants have received
and understood specified information may help to prevent misunderstandings
between overworked prosecutors, overworked defenders, and those accused of
crimes, but it may also mean that even more defendants will be reluctant to
challenge the resulting deals.1

has a parole date coming up, he doesn't want to file a [postconviction claim] -filing a
[claim] may defer his parole. Not automatic, but the board may think, 'You're still fighting
this case, why should we parole you if you are asking for a trial?"'). But see Telephone
Interview with Edward L. Marshall, Chief, Postconviction Litig. Div., Office of the Att'y
Gen. of Tex. (Nov. 9, 2012) (doubting that the parole board would ever consider whether a
prisoner filed a postconviction challenge, but noting that "an inmate is going to believe what
he wants to believe, and if you're gambling on parole release you are not going to be filing
petitions").
78.

2 JULIE RAMSEUR LEWIS & JOHN RUBIN, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL: TRIAL 374

(2d ed. 2012), http://www.ncids.org/Def/o20Manual%20Info/TextVol_2.htm (warning
against challenging pleas to lesser offenses); PDSC Plan, supra note 63, at 19 (noting that
"[s]ome cases are resolved quickly when the inmate realizes that if he is successful in
overturning his plea agreement the result will not be a dismissal of the case but a return to
court to face all of the charges again, including those that were dismissed"); Memorandum
from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 1o, at 3 (reporting that approximately 23% of cases are
withdrawn "due to the risk that vacating a plea-based conviction would expose them to
original, higher, charges"); Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73 ("We've
had cases where the guy wins and then gets a worse sentence."); Telephone Interview with
Roger Moore, supra note 49 ("In one capital case I remember, the guy pled guilty and got
life, and we told him if you get this [postconviction motion] granted we'll file the death
request-he started crying and decided not to do it.").
79.

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).

8o.

To avoid Frye and Lafler claims in state court, prosecutors who have in the past "charged
low" and added charges if a plea offer was refused may now decide to spell out the foregone
charges in more detail, or even "charge high" and reduce charges after a plea. In Texas, the
prospect of having to defend Frye challenges in state court has prompted some prosecutors
to avoid both serial negotiations and open-ended offers and instead make a single offer with
a firm deadline. Telephone Interview with Edward L. Marshall, supra note 77.

81.

Also, as one prosecutor reported, it may also create more pressure on defendants to plead
guilty even earlier. Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 ("A lot of
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2. Counsel and Hearings

Martinez is also unlikely to increase the provision of counsel and hearings
in those state postconviction cases that are filed. Even if a state's attorney
general hires more lawyers to defend habeas petitions in federal court after
Martinez, state trial judges responsible for appointing counsel and ordering
hearings in state postconviction proceedings won't feel the pinch unless federal
judges start sending more cases back for retrial. Federal habeas might then
provide resource-strapped courts an incentive to appoint more counsel and
order more hearings, but only if judges are convinced both that those
additional resources are needed in order to lower the likelihood of federal
grants and that the benefits of avoiding federal grants are worth the cost. Both
are unlikely.
State judges need not provide either counsel or evidentiary hearings in
order to ensure that their decisions denying Strickland claims survive de novo
review in federal court. If a petitioner's allegations, once proved, would not
entitle him to relief, are contradicted by the record, or are inherently incredible,
state judges may reasonably expect federal judges to uphold their practice of
denying IATC claims without hearing or counsel, which they have continued
after Martinez." After all, federal judges themselves continue, after Martinez, to
follow the same procedure when reviewing IATC claims raised for the first
time by federal petitioners."
State judges know that strategies far less expensive than hearings and
counsel are available to help deflect later attacks in federal habeas. Issuing an
alternative ruling on the merits, for example, may allow a state to invoke
Pinholsterin federal court'1 and issuing a summary denial when claims would
otherwise be rejected solely on procedural grounds may allow it to invoke

attorneys tell me that they think asking the defendants to sign is making a difference. They
say, 'When I ask a defendant to sign off, he thinks maybe he should take the offer after
all."'); cf Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25,
26-27 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/o6/18/rakoff.html (arguing that Frye and Lafler
will lead to earlier pleas); Reimer, supra note 31, at 8 ("[T]he practice of offering and
demanding an immediate plea . . . [is a] root cause of systemically deficient
representation.").

82.

See, e.g., cases collected supra notes 22-24.

83.

See, e.g., cases collected supra notes 27-28.

84. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 225 4 (d)(1) is "limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits").
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Richter.8" As post-Martinez decisions confirm, obtaining an affidavit from the
petitioner's trial counsel can provide a basis for a finding by the state judge that
the alleged conduct didn't happen, was strategic, or, if error, was not
prejudicial.86 An affidavit may also serve as a basis for a federal judge to find
that new claims based on different allegations are not "substantial" or lack
merit.8 7 Defenders will have difficulty convincing state judges they must invest
more resources in state postconviction proceedings in noncapital cases in order
to avoid reversal in federal court.
Even less plausible is the argument that the costs saved by avoiding grants
in federal court are worth investing more resources in state postconviction
procedures. Elected county judges and prosecutors do not necessarily suffer
politically when federal judges order do-overs in state criminal cases, especially
if the cause of the reversal is the defendant's own lawyer. Indeed, most of the
Strickland violations in Michigan were committed by private counsel retained
by the defendants themselves, not attorneys appointed and paid with public
funds.88 Voters, victims, and county commissioners are unlikely to blame their
state judges for that.
From a fiscal perspective, most noncapital cases receiving federal habeas
relief have been, and will continue to be, cheap to fix. New trial orders are
uncommon. A large portion of IATC claims themselves seek only a sentence

85.

See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (ruling relief is unavailable under § 22 54 (d)
if any reasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent supports summary
denial).

86. E.g., State v. Johnson, No. 9904015635, 2012 WL 5364693 at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31,
2012) (finding that "allegations were either reasonably discounted as not supported by the
record, persuasively rebutted by counsel's Affidavit, or not" relevant); see also Doug Lieb,
Regulating Through Habeas: A Bad Incentivefor Bad Lawyers?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 7, 11
(2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/regulating-through-habeas ("[H]abeas
lawyers often find themselves competing with the state attorney general's office . . . to
quickly secure trial counsel's cooperation and her commitment to submit a favorable
affidavit."); Telephone Interview with Edward L. Marshall, supra note 77 (stating that, in
Texas, the court will often order the trial attorney to file an affidavit answering the
allegations the inmate has made, and that defense counsel accused of ineffective assistance
will often provide an affidavit rebutting petitioner's claims when asked to do so by the state,
even if not ordered to do so by the court).
87. E.g., Parker v. Curley, No. Civ.A. 10-5569, 2012 WL 4931029 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2012).
88. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, supra note io, at 5 (reviewing federal habeas cases decided
between 2005 and 2010).
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reduction or an opportunity to appeal.8' Even relief for a Lafler or Frye claim
only requires amending the judgment to reflect the foregone deal, not a new
trial. And when a federal court does vacate a conviction for ineffective
assistance, the order simply puts the defendant and the prosecutor back at
square one, with at least as much incentive to avoid trial and make a deal as
they had the first time around, with maybe a little more leverage on the defense
side of the table.90
Furthermore, Martinez does not change the reasons that state trial judges
may be wary of ordering costly hearings and counsel when they don't have to,
particularly where the costs must be borne by the county and not the state. 91 In
many states, where postconviction representation in state trial courts is not
already delegated to a separate appellate or postconviction defender office,
judges must enlist appointed counsel from the same pool of attorneys available
to represent defendants before conviction or on direct appeal, and pay them
from the same funds. If a state is already having difficulty providing any

89.

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 ("Most of the time we've
had a [postconviction claim] granted for [ineffectiveness of counsel], the attorney
abandoned the defendant after trial, never filed a motion for new trial or appeal, or missed
the date. That's the majority of the [successful postconviction claims] -someone has messed
up the appeal process."); Telephone Interview with Scott Whitney, supra note 51.

go. King, supra note lo, at 314-16 (detailing the disposition of cases in which federal relief had
been granted and noting that only one of fourteen cases involved a retrial); Telephone
Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73 ("[T]he grants of relief are too rare.
[Prosecutors] don't even care about federal habeas. When we do get some sort of relief, the
A.G. will say to the D.A., 'You should settle this case,' and they do it."); see also Anup
Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REv. 1, 23, 28 (2006) (noting that habeas settlements
are "very rare" and "are typically exchanges of habeas claims for sentence reductions").
91.

Telephone Interview with Edward L. Marshall, supra note 77 (reporting that county
commissioners keep track of attorney appointment spending by judge, and that "a judge
who spends a lot of money on appointments will hear about it" and "may get in trouble
for that the next time he runs for office"); see also David Ovalle, Law Governing
Legal Fees Unconstitutional, Miami-Dade Judge Says, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 29, 2012,
http://www.miamiherald. com/2o 2/o/29/3073244/law-governing-legal-fees-unconstitutional
.html (describing a challenge to a bill that charges appointment overruns to the courts'
budgets, and quoting an attorney's claim that the bill "makes judges think twice about
paying a lawyer, knowing that he or she has to also think about paying his secretary or
buying copier paper"); Ken Malkin, Pub. Defender for Bay Cnty., Mich., Testimony Before
the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission, MICH. CAMPAIGN FOR JUST. (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs/Ken%2oMalkin%2oindigent%2odefense
%2ocommission%20testimony.docx (stating that whenever a public defender needs an
investigator or expert witness, she must ask the court for funds, but that "often a judge can
be more concerned about the fiscal impact on the county than the impact on a client's
defense").
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counsel at all in its misdemeanor cases, for example, 9 adding more
representation responsibilities in postconviction proceedings is a likely
nonstarter. An uptick in appointments may even encounter resistance from the
defender community itself. As an important feature of sustainable indigent
defense reform, states are struggling to find ways to shrink rather than expand
the demands on public defenders. 93
Even if state judges decided to safeguard their convictions against federal
review by appointing counsel in postconviction cases, they could safely restrict
this strategy to only those petitioners challenging their convictions (not their
sentences), after a trial (not a plea), and who are serving particularly lengthy
sentences. The Martinez dissenters' prediction that states will have no choice
but to provide counsel in every case is absurd.
Also farfetched is the opposite prediction: that if federal courts start
granting relief in more cases, state legislatures will refuse to spend any more
money on state postconviction review and will just let the federal courts deal
with it. 94 Abandoning state postconviction review would forfeit one of a state's
most effective tools for reducing postconviction litigation in federal court:
delay. States also use their own postconviction remedies to address changes in
state criminal law, to consider new evidence of innocence, and to facilitate
quick responses tailored to local criminal justice problems. If there is a flaw in a
case that is going to require retrial, all would agree it is better to find that out
sooner rather than later. 95 Besides, many state prosecutors prefer their chances
2

92.

See, e.g., Erica Hashimoto, Abandoning Misdemeanor Defendants, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 103
(2012) (collecting and discussing authority documenting the denial of counsel to
misdemeanor defendants in several states).

93.

One public defender in Maryland, for example, complained that a recent appellate court
decision, reversed by legislation, which would have required counsel at initial bail hearings,
would have stretched his office's resources to the breaking point. See Tricia Bishop, State
Lawmakers Reverse High Court Ruling on Public Defenders, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2012,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2o 12-04-13/news/bs-md-public-defender-bills-20120413_1
_high-court-ruling-public-defenders-hearings (quoting a public defender stating that the
decision "would have decimated the ability to do the work that we already do"); see also Brief
for the States of Wisconsin et al., supra note 9, at 15-16 (arguing that a right to
postconviction counsel would "stretch[]" public defender offices "even thinner" and direct
resources away from trial and direct appeal).

94.

See Brief for the States of Wisconsin et al., supra note 9, at 36 n.22 (urging the Court not to
"articulate a rule that would encourage a State to curtail an avenue of review that it might
otherwise make available to its citizens in order to thwart meddling by the federal courts
that undermine the finality of state court decisions").

95.

See Freedman, supra note 36, at 298 (noting that "states have sound reasons for not
abandoning their systems of collateral attack").
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before state rather than federal judges.96
3. Relief
Finally, even if more state judges do decide to provide counsel and hearings
to postconviction petitioners, the low grant rates in states where this is already
common suggest that relief rates would not change. Consider Ohio, where the
state public defenders have for years taken a uniquely proactive approach to
postconviction representation in noncapital cases. At each of the state's three
intake prisons, a public defender interviews every arriving inmate who was
convicted after a trial, looking for potential nonrecord claims such as ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. One supervising defender estimated that only about
io% of these interviews produce a potential claim that is referred to the office
for further action, which includes the possible assignment of one of their
investigators, and review of the trial transcript. Only about 10% of those
referrals pan out as viable claims to file, yielding a total of about twenty
petitions per year. Yet almost all of these cherry-picked cases, ably litigated by
dedicated and experienced defenders, are rejected by the state courts. 97
CONCLUSION: THE DISCONNECT

BETWEEN

POSTCONVICTION

REVIEW AND INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM

Gideon's promise is that every person accused of a crime will have
competent representation when he needs it the most-before he is convicted.
In states still struggling to meet this goal, expanding federal habeas review is
unlikely to help. Reformers may be getting the message.
Consider Michigan's recent experience. A groundbreaking reform shifting
funding to the state and earmarking millions for indigent defense was
proposed by an Indigent Defense Advisory Commission appointed by a

96. Telephone Interview with Roger Moore, supra note 49 ("Should we get rid of state
[postconviction review] and just let them go to federal court? No-Tennessee added state
[postconviction review] so the state can have the first say, and the legislature took that to
heart. It would be unwise not to have a state 'buffer.' The person in the best position to
review the claim is the trial judge, not some other judge.").
Telephone Interview with Jay A. Macke, supra note 73. Twenty inmates is approximately
0.5-2% of the number of inmates committed to Ohio prisons each year after conviction at
trial. See DRC DataSource Reports-DRCAnnual Report, OH. DEP'T OF REHABILITATION
CORRECTION, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/Reports/reports2.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(providing commitment data from 2001 to 2011).

&

97.
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Republican governor and approved by the Republican-controlled House last
fall. 98 Prosecutors argued that the tiny number of cases in which state or federal
courts found ineffective assistance, and the fact that most involved retained
counsel, showed that any problem with the quality of indigent defense in
Michigan is not systemic. 99 For their part, reform advocates did not rely on an
earlier (and somewhat implausible) claim that 50 Strickland wins in over 25
years was itself proof of a serious crisis.' Instead, they pitched to the
Commission an argument about fiscal responsibility that depended upon the
inability of postconviction review to identify bad lawyering. They argued that
postconviction relief is no measure of the extent of the problem, but that other
evidence is: the rate at which errors in sentencing are established on appeal and
the number of exonerees freed after unsuccessfully claiming ineffective
assistance. Millions of dollars are wasted imprisoning those who would not be
in prison at all or who would have received shorter sentences if they had
received competent representation, the reformers maintained."
With litigation lurking over its shoulder, 1 2 Michigan's Commission
agreed. "[I]neffective assistance of trial counsel claims . .. are not necessarily
the only indicator of a well-functioning system," the Commission reported.
"The current delivery of indigent defense results in a public defense system
that is too often subject to errors at the trial level, and at its worst, results in a

98. Michigan House OKs Overhaul of Indigent Defense, CBS DETROIT, Nov. 8, 2012,
http://detroit.cbsiocal.conm/2012/11/o8/michigan-house-oks-overhaul-of-indigent-defense.
The bill is expected to be taken up by the Michigan Senate in 2013. See David Carroll, The
Clock Runs Out on Michigan Reform for This Year, PLEADING THE SIXrH (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://sixthamendment.org/?p=1o81.
99. Letter from Joel D. McGormley, supra note 10.
100.

See Representation of Indigent Defendants in CriminalCases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michigan
and Other States? HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the
H. Comm. on theJudiciary, ith Cong. 1o8, 120 (2009) (statement of Dawn Van Hoek, Dir.,
Mich. State Appellate Defender Office) (hereinafter Van Hoek Testimony].

101. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra note 1o; William Fleener, Staff Att'y,

Cooley Innocence Project, Testimony to the Indigent Defense Advisory Commission, MICH.
CAMPAIGN FOR JUST. (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs
/Fleener%2oTestimony%20to%20the%20Indigent%2oDefense%2oAdvisory0/20Commissio
n%2ofinal.doc.
102.

See Duncan v. State, No. 307790 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011) (alleging that the state had
abdicated its constitutional and statutory responsibility by delegating responsibility for
indigent defense to individual counties and failing to fund or provide oversight for such
services).
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wrongful conviction."" 3 No one seemed interested in improving
postconviction review for IATC claims. Indeed, defenders argued that better
representation at trial could reduce the high cost of postconviction review.1 "4 If
Michigan's experience is any guide, lasting structural reform in indigent
defense may gain better traction if the rate of postconviction relief for IATC
claims remains negligible and petitioners continue to lose.
In Michigan, as elsewhere, disagreement about the extent of constitutional
compliance and the efficacy of postconviction review is rooted in a fundamental
dispute about what the Sixth Amendment requires. Does it guarantee
reasonably competent representation, but condition relief upon a finding of
prejudice? Or does it instead guarantee, as the Court has explained,' only an
attorney who does not make prejudicial mistakes? Redefining the right to
effective assistance as independent from its impact on the outcome of
proceedings would probably make violations easier to detect. But this approach
poses at least two problems: the list of acts or omissions that would necessarily
be against the best interests of any client in any case would be extremely
short;' and the inherent weaknesses of enforcement through postconviction
review would remain.
Courts could order legislatures to fund more sweeping system-wide reform
if the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to prohibit deficiencies in delivery
systems that pose a high probability of compromising effective assistance -a
claim for which "existing law," as Professor William Stuntz lamented fifteen

103.

Report of the Michigan Advisory

Commission on Indigent Defense, MICH. ADVISORY
http://www.michigan.gov/documents

COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEF. 8 (June 22, 2012),

/snyder/IndigentDefenseAdvisoryComm_Rpt-390212_7.pdf.
104.

Van Hoek Testimony, supra note loo, at 120; Memorandum from Dawn Van Hoek, supra
note io, at 5. The same argument has been made in other states as support for funding
indigent defense. See, e.g., PDSC Plan, supra note 63.

ios. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) ("The requirement that

a defendant show prejudice in effective representation cases arises from the very nature of
the specific element of the right to counsel at issue there-effective (not mistake-free)
representation. Counsel cannot be 'ineffective' unless his mistakes have harmed the defense
(or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation is not 'complete' until the defendant is
prejudiced."); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2001) ("[D]efects in assistance that
have no probable effect upon the [case's] outcome do not establish a constitutional
violation.").
106.

E.g., William

J.

Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal

Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1997) (noting the difficulty of "separat[ing] low-activity but
good representation from laziness or incompetence").
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years ago, still "leaves no room."' Litigation such as the ongoing class action
case in Michigan is attempting to move courts in this direction.' But we are a
long way from consensus about what deficiencies are most salient, or when
they become constitutionally intolerable when applied to defenders' offices, to
appointed counsel, or, most perplexing of all, to retained counsel.
Fortunately, the Court's jurisprudence regarding the indigent defendant's
right to counsel in state criminal cases is not grounded in originalist
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment, and has instead looked to evolving
standards. Gideon itself abandoned a case-by-case approach to the provision of
counsel to indigents in felony cases only after most of the states had already
proven the feasibility of compliance with a blanket rule. In the decades to
come, lower courts, state legislatures, or even voters" 9 might once again move
out ahead of the Court, toward a rough consensus about the conditions that so
disable the provision of effective assistance to those accused in our "system of
pleas"" that a Sixth Amendment violation should be presumed. Along the
way, system-wide litigation might succeed in grabbing state legislators'
attention, but case-by-case postconviction review under the unforgiving
Strickland standard never will.

107.
log.

Id. at 21.
See Duncan v. State, No. 307790 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011); see generally Cara H.
Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense Litigation, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 138,
138-39 (2012) (discussing recent litigation in the Supreme Court on the right to counsel);
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of the Court's Recent Cases on
Structural Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 106 (2012) (same).

109. See Milan Simonich, ConstitutionalAmendment 5 Would EstablishPublic Defender Department,

LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS (N.M), Oct. 8, 2012, http://www.csun-news.con/ci_21719567
/lascruces-financial (describing an amendment to increase the independence of the state
public defender, which ultimately passed with 62% of the vote).
110. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
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